PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

As 'MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE

REPORTS.

ASSAULT.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas decides in
Chambless v. State, 79 S. W. 577, that where a man without the consent of a woman and by the use of
Kis

force attempts to make her kiss him, he is guilty
of an assault; but where he reasonably believes, -under.
the circumstances, that she would allow him to kiss her,
and merely attempts to kiss her by consent, intending no
force, he is not guilty. This rather amusing result seems
to embody an important principle. Compare a decision of
the same court made very recently in Stripling v. State, 8o

S. W. 376.
BANKS.

In Continental National Bank of Memphis, Teun., v.
FirstNational Bank of West Point,36 S. i89, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi decides that where a bank
coIIS to,:

forwards checks for collection to its correspondent under a general indorsement in blank, and
the correspondent in turn sends them under a like indorsement to a third bank, which, pursuant to the course of uniform dealing existing between it and the correspondent,
applies the proceeds to the correspondent's account, without
any knowledge of the insolvency of the correspondent or
of the claim of the initial bank, it cannot be required to again
account to the initial bank for the proceeds .of the collection,
since the initial bank by forwarding the collections under an
unlimited indorsement divested itself of ownership, and retained simply the right to look to its correspondent for payment. See the recent decision of American Exchange National Bank v. Theniniler, 195 I1. 90.

Unlimited
Indorsemnt
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BANKS (Continued).

The Supreme Court of Kansas holds in Kimmel v. Bean,
75 Pac. ii iS, that a bank which receives from an agent for
osit by deposit in his own name the money of his princiAtget
pal, without notice of the agency, is protected,
in applying it to a past-due debt of the depositor, to the
same extent as in paying it out upon his checks whenever
such application is authorized by the agent, either expressly
or by legal implication, and such authority ordinarily arises
from the making of a deposit, without other directions, where
the debt to which it is applied is an overdraft. See also in
connection with this case the decision in Cady v. South
Omaha National Bank, 46 Neb. 756, where a somewhat inconsistent result was reached.

BANKRUPTCY.

The Supreme Court of the United States decides in
CharlesA. Tinkcr v. FrederickL. Colwell, 24 S.C. R. 505,
that a judgment for damages for criminal conEffect of
DischaMe
versation is one recovered in an action "for
wilful and malicious injuries to the person or property of
another" within the meaning of.the provision of the bankruptcy act of July x, 1898, excepting judgments recovered
in such actions from the operation of a discharge in bankruptcy. Compare Macfadzen v. Olivent, 6 East 387.

The Supreme Court of Nebraska holds in Cleland v.
Anderson, 98 N. W. 1075, that a right of action for tort
Popeft: is not property within the meaning of the naT ts
tional bankruptcy act; and, even though an
thereon, such right does not pass to the
pending
action is
trustee in bankruptcy. Applying this rule, it is decided, with
one judge dissenting, that an action for conspiracy, whereby
plaintiff was " driven out of business as a dealer in lumber,"
is tin action in tort, and does not arise "from the unlawful
taking or detention of, or injury to, his property" within
the meaning of the federal bankruptcy act.
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BUILDING RESTRICTIONS.

The general rule that a building restriction must be construed strictly is applied in a somewhat striking way in the
of Crofton v. St. Clement's Church, 57 Atl.
Construction case
57 o , where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
decides that where a deed provided that no dwelling should
be erected on the rear end of a lot, and the rear end of the
lot was on the north side of a street thirty-four feet -wide,
an erection of a building, no portion of which was within
ten feet of such north side of the street, was not on the rear
end of the lot. It is further held that the words "dwelling
house," which kind of building was prohibited.by the restriction, do not include a building attached to a church
containing living-rooms, bed-rooms, and studies for the
clergy, and also rooms for the guilds and various organizations of the church.
CARRIERS.

The Supreme Court of the United States, which has
consistently adhered to the rule that a passenger upon a
free pass may release the railroad company
Frce pass:
Limitation of from liability even for negligence (see Northern
Pacific Railway Company v. Adams, 192 U. S.
Liability
44o), extends this principle by holding in John D. Boering
v. Chcsapcake Beach Railway Conzpany, 24 S. C. R. 5i5,
that a stipulation in a free railway pass requiring the user
to assume the risk of injury due to the carrier's negligence
is binding on a person accepting the privilege, although
notice of such stipulation may. not have been brought home
to her.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

It is decided by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in
Adanis v. Mississippi Lumber Co., 36 S. 68, that a statute
imposing a privilege tax on each land, timber,
Interstate
Commerce
mill company or individual, providing the section shall not apply to sawmill operators who do not ship
timber or lumber out of the state, is invalid as a tax on
interstate commerce. It is further held that -such tax is
lacking in uniformity. With the first holding should be
compared the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Gcer v. Connecticut, x6i U. S. 519.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued).

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky decides in City of
Louisville v. Wlchnof, 79 S. V. 2O, that a city ordinance
forbidding the transmission to a pool-room
Policy
Power:
operator of messages intended to be used in the
Interstate business of pool selling in the city is a valid
Commerce exercise of the police power of the state, and
further holds that an ordinance forbidding transmission of
such messages to pool-rooms is not an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce, though the telegrams come
from another state. With this case should be compared the
case of Western Union Telegraph Co. v. James, 162 U. S.
65o.
In.Goodrich v. Mitchcll, 75 Pac. 1034, the Supreme Court
of Kansas decides that a law which provides that those who
Preference of have served in the army and navy of the United
veterans

States in the War of the Rebellion, and have

been honorably discharged therefrom, shall be preferred for
appointment to office in every public department and upon
all public works of the state and of the cities and towns
thereof is constitutional. With this case compare State v.
Garbroski, iii Iowa 496, which on its facts is against the
validity of preference of veterans.
A law of Utah passed in i9oi provided that a sale of any
portion of a stock of merchandise out of the ordinary course
Sates In
of trade, or a sale of an entire stock in bulk, is
Bulk
fraudulent and void as against creditors of the
seller unless an inventory as prescribed is made five days
before the sale, and all the creditors of the seller of which
the purchaser has or may obtain knowledge by reasonable
diligence shall have been notified thereof; and another
section makes the violation of the previous section a misdemeanor. Under these facts the Supreme Court of the state
decides in Block v. Schwartz, 76 Pac. 22, that such act was
unconstitutional, as depriving a merchant owing debts of.
his liberty to contract, amounting to a deprivation of propertv without due process of law. A very satisfactory review
of the principles involved is made by the court. The general
principles involved are, of course, well known, but their
application in this case seems an important one.
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CONTRACTS.

In Baxter v. Dcnccn, 57 At. 6oi, the facts were that A
entered into a gambling contract with B, a bucket-shop
Gambln.g:
Relief In

dealer, on the rise and fall of stocks, putting up

margins with B, who agreed to keep enough
money in the bank to liquidate claims. Under
these circumstances the Court of Appeals of Maryland holds,
with one judge dissenting, that equity would not lend its aid
to compel performance of the agreement by enjoining B's
withdrawal of money from the bank, although he intends to
remove it from the state and cheat A. Compare the Pennsylvania decision of Daulcr v. Campbell, 35 Atl. 857, and
Gough v. Pratt,9 Md. 526.
Equity

CORPORATIONS.

In Thorst v. Lewis, 98 N. AV. 1o46, the Supreme Court
of Nebraska decides that a brewing corporation may become
liable as surety upon a liquor license bond exeActing a
Surety
cuted by it to induce the licensee to lease a
building from it and deal exclusively in its products.
It is decided by the Court of Chancery of New Jersey in
Public Service Corp. v. -AmericanLighting Co., 57. At]. 482,
that a foreign corporation having no franchise
Public
within the state, being neither a citizen nor a
sRric:
Foreign

householder thereof, the sole business of which

is the furnishing of a patent gas burner, has no
standing in its own right to demand and receive a supply
of gas from a domestic corporation for any purpose whatever.
Corporations

EMINENT DOMAIN.

In Tonvm of Haclehurst v. Mayes, 36 S. 33, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi holds that where a city Xwas operating
under a law which grants municipalities auCutting
Treea
thority to exercise full jurisdiction over the
streets, and to light the same and to provide for the erection
of lamp-posts, the city had a right to trim trees standing
between the sidewalk and a. public highway to any degree
necessary to prevent interference with the wires of a lighting
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EMINENT DOMAIN (Continued).

plant erected by the city, and without compensation to the
abutting owner.. Compare Vanderhurst v. Tholcke, 113 Cal.
347.
Against the dissent of. two judges the Cdurt of Errors
and Appeals of New Jersey decides in Albright v. Sussex
Fisbng
County Lake and Park Commission, 57 Atl.
Rights
398, that the right to fish in an inland lake
in New Jersey cannot be separated from the ownership of
the lake and taken under the power of eminent domain, because, first, the natural supply of fish therein is so small as
to be incapable of meeting a public demand; and, second,
the object of acquiring such a right is not use, which implies
utility, but mere sport or pastime. The following question
is raised, but not answered: Is the value of such a right
capable of estimation, so that a compensation may be
awarded therefor which shall be just with respect both to the
private owner and to the public purchaser? See also Albright v. Cortright,64 N. J. Law, 330.

EXECUTORS.

A resident in Ohio, owning in Kansas a farm that had
never been used for other than agricultural purposes, exePowers: ass: cuted a will therein providing that the executor
Petroleum and trustee should take charge of said premises
and "lease and maintain the same in good condition,
with a view, to obtain the best income therefrom, without
permitting the sameto deteriorate in value or quality."'
Under these facts the Supreme Court of Kansas decides
in Lanyon Zinc Co. v. Freeman, 75 Pac. 995, that the
executor'and trustee was not by said will authorized to
execute an oil and gas lease granting to the lessee all the
oil and gas under said premises and to bind the legatees
thereby. Petroleum and gas, it is said, are minerals. So
long as they remain in the ground they are a part of the
realty and cannot be disposed of except under a specific
power or a power which gives the right to dispose of the
realty. In connection with this case the decision in Wilsoni
v. Youst, 43 AV.Va. 826, is worthy of note.
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EXECUTORS (Continued).

In Currier v. Clark, 75 Pac. 927, the Court of Appeals
of Colorado holds that an agreement of an executor with
Resignation: beneficiaries to resign for a-consideration is illePublic Polcy
gal as against public policy, making invalid the
notes given as the consideration. Compare Ellicott v. Chainbcrlain, 38 N. J. Eq. 6o4.

FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.

In Sigel-Campion Live-Stock Commission Co. v. Haston, 75 Pac. 1o28, the Supreme Court of Kansas decides
Action by:
that isolated, independent transactions in-the
Doing
state incidentally necessary to the business of a
Business
foreign corporation, conducted at its domicile,
fully completed before action commenced, will not prevent
recovery in the courts of the state by such corporation when
no repetition of such acts is in contemplation, and, the territory of the state is not being made the basis of operations
for the conduct of any part of the corporation's business at
the time the suit is begun. See Thomas v. Remington Paper
Co., 73 Pac. go9.

GIFTS.

In Davis v. Seaboard Air-Line R. Co., 46 S. E. 515,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina decides that Where,
what
in an action against a railroad company for killConstitutes
ing a cow, plaintiff testified that though he purchased the cow with his own money he gave her to his wife,
and placed metal tags in the cow's ear with his wife's name
stamped on them; that the cow ran on the farm, which belonged to the wife, with the plaintiff's other cattle, and that,
notwithstanding the wife accepted the gift, plaintiff regarded
the cow as belonging .to both him and his -wife-whether
there was a completed gift of the cow to the wife, so as to
vest the title in her, was properly submitted to the jury.
One judge dissents, holding that as a matter of law such
facts show a completed gift.
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GUARDIAN

AND

VARD.

In Trumbull v. Trumbull, 98 N. NV. 683, the Supreme,
Court of Nebraska, holding that the rights of guardian and
Alienutloi of
parents are the same with reference to advice
Affection
as-to separation by the ward from husband or
wife, decides 'that the presumption is -that the advice was
given in good faith, and that in a suit for damages for
alienation of affections it is a good defence, on the part of a'
guardian, that he advised the ward from honest motives, in
a sincere belief that the advice given was for the moral and
social good of the ward. See Reed v. Reed, 33 N. E. 638.

HUSBAND, AND. WIFE.

The United States District Court (Eastern District of
Pennsylvania) decides In re Domenig, 128 Fed. 146, that
Bankruptcy: the Pennsylvania statute of .1893 (P. L. 345,
Witnesses

Sec. 3), providing that a wife may'not sue her

husband except-for divorce or-for recovery of ber separate
property after his desertion, does not prevent her from
proving a- claim -against his estate in bankruptcy, which isnot a proceeding against him nor - even- adverse to him.
It is also held that the Pennsylvania statute of 1887 (P L.
i58, Sec. 2b), which forbids husband and wife to testify
"against each other," does not render the testimony of a
wife incompetent in support of a claim filed by her against
her husband's estate in bankruptcy. See in connection with
this case Nuding v. Urich, 169 Pa. 289.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, holding that a hus-band may make a valid gift to his'wife by transferring an
lifts:
account to her name, though she knows noth-.
Trover
ing of the transaction at the time, holds that
where a husband transferred an account with certain stockbrokers from his own name to that of his wife, -and the
brokers made the transfer on their books and thereafter
sold the securities in an action for a debt-of the husband
without notice to the wife or to the husband, who was
managing her account, the wife could sustain trover therefor: Sparks v. Hurley, 57 AtI. 364. See also Roberts's
Appeal, 85 Pa. 84.
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INJUNCTIONS.

A railroad company is entitled to injunction to restrain
ticket brokers from buying and selling tickets issued by it
Ticket
to persons who, in consideration of reduced
Brokerage
rates, have contracted not to transfer the same,
the non-transferability being stated on their face: United
States Circuit Court (Eastern District of Louisiana) in
Louisville and N. R. Co. v. Bitterman, 128 Fed. 176.

JOINT TORT FEASORS.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky decides in Louisville
and Evansville Mail Co. v. Barnes's Adn'r, 79 S. V. 261,
that the acceptance by one, who has a cause of
Release of
One: Effect
action against two joint tort feasors, of a sun
of money from one of them in part satisfaction and in consideration of a release of the tort feasor making the payment
does not preclude recovery against the other.
Sno, v. Chandler, IO N. H. 92.

Compare

JUDGMENTS.
The Supreme Court of Kansas decides in Clevenger v.

Figley, 75 Pac. iooi, that in an actioni to foreclose a mortgage given by the owner of land jointly with
Collateral
Attack:
the guardian of his insane wife the District
Jurisdiction
Court has jurisdiction to determine whether or
not the premises were a homestead at the time the mortgage
was executed, and to decide whether or not the instrument
expressed the joint consent of husband and wife; and a
judgment involving an erroneous decision of those matters
is not open to collateral attack, but is valid-and binding
upon the parties and their privies until corrected in a direct
proceeding for that purpose. The case presents a very
careful review of the authorities in point. With it should
be compared the decision in Vatkins Land and Mortgage
Co. v. Mullin, 62 Kan. i.
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LANDLORD AND TENANT.

In Ehinger v. Bahl, 57 AtI. 572, it appeared that a tenant
from month to month notified his landlord of a crack in the
wall of the building, and .that he would move if
Rep.ars:
Action by
it were not repaired. The landlord promised to
Tenant
repair, but failed to do so, and the building fell,
injuring the tenant's property. It is decided by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania that the tenant had a right of action
against the landlord, the general principle, being laid down
that where a landlord fails t9 make repairs as promised, and
in consequence the Wtiilding falls and damages the tenant's
property, the landlord is liable.

In Oppenheimer v. Chuie, 75 Pac. 899, the Supreme
Court of California holds that a lessee of a theatre will be
Rescission o held to have acquiesced in the lease after the
Lesse
knowledge of the facts, and so is not entitled to
rescind it for fraudulent representations of the lessor that
the exits and stairways were sufficiently large and in the
proper places for emptying the theatre, he having taken possession and used it a season before attempting to rescind.
It is further decided that the report of a grand jury as to
the unsafe condition of a theatre is hearsay and not admissible in an action to rescind a lease of the theatre. With the
first decision compare Colton v. Stanford, 82 Cal. 399.

LIMITATIONS.

In Linck v..Linck, 79 S. V. 478, the St. Louis.Court of
Appeals of Missouri decides that under the Missouri law
exempting married woman from the operation
MarrIed
woman:
of the Statute of Limitations during coverture,
Alienation of the statute does not run against a wife's right
Affection
of action for alienation of her husband's affection until termination of the coverture.
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MORTGAGES.

In Kennedy v. Gibson, 75 Pac. zo44, it is decided by the
Supreme Court of Kansas that where a promissory note
ConstructiQa: provides that'default in the payments of interest
Option in
shall mature the whole debt at the option of the
Note
holder, and a mortgage given to secure payment
of the note provides that defaults shall mature the debt, but
makes no mention of an option in the holder, the provision
in the note will control. See Hutchinson v. Benedict, 49
Kans. 545.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

In Fox v. City of Philadelphia,57 At]. 356, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania decides that where a city operates
Elcyators:
an elevator in a public building; which building
Liability
was at the time of the accident in the control
of the city, and where the elevator was used in carrying the
public to the courts, the city is liable to a passenger injured
by the negligence of the operator, and the rule applicable to
common carriers, that the happening of an accident to a
passenger raises prima facie a presumption of negligence on
the part of the carrier, applies. Compare McClain v. Henderson, 187 Pa. 283, and Hartford Deposit Co. v. Sollilt,
172 Ill. 222.

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island decides in Fox-v.,
Clarke, 57 At. 305, that a bicycle rider is not entitled to
recover for injuries sustained by reason of a
Streets:
Defects:
defect in the street where the defect would not
Bicycles
have caused injury to an ordinary traveller.
Compare State v. Collins, x6 R. I. 371, where it was held
that a bicycle was a vehicle within the meaning of a statute "
requiring one travelling on a highway with "any carriage or
other vehicle" to turn to the right. The practical bearing
of the above decision is. of course, very important. Another
ver, recent decision, City of Louisville v. Keler, 79 S. W.
270, is of special interest in this connection.

40

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

NEGLIGENCE.

In Saylor v. Parsons, 98 N. W. Soo, the Supreme Court
of Iowa holds that one who seeks to rescue another frbm
Contributory imminent danger, thereby imperilling his own
Negligence
life, is not, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence. The 'ecent case in Pennsylvania of
Corbin v. Philadelphia, 195 Pa. 461, where- the Supreme
Court in a divided opinion reached the same conclusion, will
be recalled.
PARENT AND CHILD.

In Aycock v. Hampton, 36 S. 245, the Supreme Court of
Mississippi holds that the putative father of a bastard child,
C-stody

who is able to take care of and support it, is
entitled to its custody after the death of the

mother. There seems to be not much authority in this country on this question. See, however, Commonuealth v. Aniderson, i Ashm. 55.
In James v. Aller, 57 AtI. 476, the Court of Chancery of
New Jersey decides that a gift by a father to his children
lifts:

of his entire property remaining after previous

transfers to them, and constituting the balance
of his savings, made without any advice when his second
wife, who had separated from him, was threatening him
with legal proceedings for sutport, and containing no power
of revocation and without any provision for his future support, may be revoked, though executed without any undue
influence of the children. But it is further held, on the other
hand. that where a father has executed a gift of property to
his children, and they have received the income, relying on
the gift of it, and have expended it mainly as the father
diretted, on the revocation of the gift the income cannot
be.recovered.
Revocation

PARTITION.

If Smnner v. Early, 46 S. E. 492, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina holds tlhat where tenants in common of one
Specific

tract of land and tenants incommon of another

mutually agreed that all the lands should be
partitioned "as if they held the said lands as tenants in
common," the remedy on the refusal of the tenants in comPerformance
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PARTITION (Continued).

mon of one of the tracts to carry out the agreement is by
suit for specific performance, and not by a special proceeding
for partition, the agreement being executory only.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

In Steen v. Kirkpatrick, 36 S. 14o, the Supreme Court of
'Mississippi holds that an agreement is not within the Statute
Agreement in of Frauds, as - upon consideration of marriage"
Consideration where it is made after the contract to marry has.
of Marriage become binding, though it is in contemplation
of marriage. See I Bishop Married Women, Sec. 8o6;
Rainbolt v. East, 56 Ind. 538.

TAXATION.
The method of taxation adopted where a corporation is
doing a business both intrastate and interstate is considered
Non.Resldent in James C. Fargo v. William H. Hart, 24
S. C. R. 498, where the Supreme Court of the
Express
United States holds that personal property
Company:
Mileage Basis owned by a non-resident express company and
situated outside the state cannot be taken into account in
fixing the value, for taxation, of its property within the
state, on a mileage basis, on the theory that it gave the credit
necessary for carrying on the business in the state, where the
resulting assessment is greatly in excess of the value of the
total good-will of the company, measured by the difference
between its tangible assets and the total value of its stock.
See in connection with this case Maine v. Grand,Trunk Rail'ay Company, 142 U. S. 217. It is further held that tender

is iot a prerequisite to injunctive relief against an assessment for taxation made upon unconstitutional principles.
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USURY.

The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas decides in Southern
Trading Co. v. State National Bank of Ft. Worth, 79 S. W.
payment a

644, that the fact that a borrower, in order to

secure a loan, agrees to pay not only legal interest, but also a judgment on which he and the
lender are liable, does not render the loan usurious, even
though the judgment is one on which contribution could not
be enforced. Compare Campion v. Kille, x4 N.J. Eq. 232.
Independent
Debt

WITNESSES.

In Delaware the rule of the common law prevails that a
wife may not testify in behalf of her husband in a criminal
comptecy: proceeding. Recognizing this rule, the Court
Husband
of General Sessions of Delaware decides in State
and Wife
v. Smith, 57 Ati. 368, that the wife of one of
two defendants jointly indicted for larceny is a competent
witness for the defendant who is not her husband. It is
therefore held that a severance will not be granted to one
of two defendants jointly indicted for larceny on the ground
that the wife of the other defendant is an important witness
for the defendant asking the severance. See in connection
with this case The United States v. Awdatte, 6 Blanchf. 76.
The New York law similar to the law in most stites prohibits disclosure by a physician of professional information
acquired while he is acting in a professional
Phyaleans
capacity and where such information is necessary
to enable him so to act. In Meyer v. Supreme Lodge K. P.,
70 N. E. Ill., the Court of Appeals of New Ydrk holds that
this provision applies where a physician is called to treat- a
patient ag aiist the will of the patient. The case is carefullydiscusd on both sides, there being two dissenting justices
and one dissenting opinion, See and compare People v.
Sliney, 137 N. Y.'5,o, where it is held that when a physician
is sent by a prosecuting officer to make a report upon the
sanity of a prisoner, if he does not treat or prescribe for the.
.subject, statements of the latter are not protected.

